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Abstract
Neoliberalism is widely regarded as the main culprit for the 2007/2008 global financial 
crisis. However, despite this abysmal failure, neoliberalism has not merely survived 
the crisis, but actually ‘thrived’. How is it possible to account for the resilience of 
neoliberalism? Existing scholarship has answered this question either by focusing 
on the distinctive qualities of neoliberalism (such as adaptability, internal coherence 
and capacity to incorporate dissent) or on the biopolitical capacity of neoliberalism 
to produce resilient subjects. This article adopts a different perspective. Drawing on 
and partially challenging the perspective of Michel Foucault, I argue that neoliberalism 
and biopolitics should be considered two complementary governmental rationalities, 
and that biopolitical rationalities contribute to governing the uncertainties and risks 
stemming from the neoliberalization of life. Biopolitics, in other words, plays a key 
role in governing the resilience of neoliberalism. Through this conceptual lens, the 
article explores how biopolitical rationalities of care have been deployed to govern 
the neoliberal crisis of the Greek sovereign debt, which threatened the stability of 
the European banking system and, I shall argue, the neoliberal life, wealth and well-
being of the European population. The article discusses how biopolitical racism is an 
essential component of the biopolitical governance of neoliberalism. Biopolitical racism 
displaces the sources of risk, dispossession and inequality from the neoliberal regime 
to ‘inferior’ populations, whose lack of compliance with neoliberal dictates is converted 
into a threat to our neoliberal survival. This threat deserves punishment and authorizes 
further dynamics of neoliberal dispossession.
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Introduction
It has been widely observed that the 2007/2008 global financial crisis engendered the 
expectation of a shift towards a ‘post-neoliberal regime’ that ultimately failed to mate-
rialize (Konings, 2016: 268; see also Crouch, 2011; Dean, 2014; Harvey, 2011; Peck, 
2010; Peck et al., 2010; Schmidt and Thatcher, 2013). The main dimensions of neolib-
eralism — competition, privatization, deregulation, individual responsibility, privati-
zation of profits and socialization of losses, the centrality of the market mechanism for 
the allocation of essential goods and services, and (specifically in the case of Europe) 
austerity — have retained, if not augmented, their ideological prominence and prac-
tical relevance. Irrespective of how neoliberalism is understood — as a political 
philosophy, governmental rationality, economic theory or regime of subjectification 
(Dean, 2014: 151) — its hegemony seems unchallenged. Scholars have questioned 
this apparent anomaly; after all, all major financial crises, such as the 1930s’ Great 
Depression and the 1970s’ crisis of Keynesianism, have been ‘turning points for eco-
nomic shifts and public policies’ (Bohle and Greskovits, 2015: 1). Others, however, 
have highlighted the intimate connection between neoliberalism and crisis (Harvey, 
2011; Mirowski, 2013; Peck et al., 2010; Roitman, 2013), namely, how neoliberalism 
as a response to the 1970s’ crisis of Keynesianism has resulted in a socio-political and 
economic paradigm routinely punctuated by crises. Yet, even the proponents of the 
idea of neoliberalism as a crisis-driven mode of governance consider that the magni-
tude and scale of the 2007/2008 global financial crisis, which has triggered the worst 
recession since the Great Depression, has been such that it would not have been unrea-
sonable to expect a more substantial challenge to the neoliberal paradigm. Why has 
this not happened? How is it possible to account for the resilience of neoliberalism? 
This is the main question that this article will strive to address.
Two types of scholarship have directly or indirectly tackled this question. A first 
group of scholars has focused on the distinctive qualities of neoliberalism. In particular, 
they have emphasized: the amorphous and adaptable nature of neoliberalism (Schmidt 
and Thatcher, 2013), which often results in tensions between neoliberal theory and prac-
tice (Harvey, 2005, 2011); neoliberalism’s parasitical relationship with existing social 
formations (Peck et al., 2010); its being a form of ‘thought collective’, namely, an intel-
lectual framework capable of absorbing dissent and crystallizing consensus (Dean, 2014) 
by offering simple solutions to complex problems (Schmidt and Thatcher, 2013); its 
being the carrier of the interests of large corporations, which have come to dominate 
public life (Crouch, 2011); and its internal coherence and capacity to reorganize through 
the incorporation of uncertainty and risk (Konings, 2016). All these factors conjure up 
the absence of a strong ideological opponent, which leaves neoliberalism virtually 
unchallenged (Peck et al., 2010; Schmidt and Thatcher, 2013).
A second group of scholars has explained the resilience of neoliberalism by focusing 
on its biopolitical dimension. Their argument is that neoliberalism should be primarily 
understood as a regime of subjectification geared towards the production of resilient 
subjects capable of adapting to the neoliberal mechanisms of production, exploitation, 
accumulation and dispossession (Chandler and Reid, 2016; Dean, 2014; Joseph, 2013; 
Reid, 2012; Schmidt, 2015). The resilience of neoliberalism would thus rest on the 
 by guest on November 22, 2016ejt.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Mavelli 3
resilience of its subjects and their capacity to withstand the shocks of a socio-economic 
order naturally attuned to produce crises. This perspective generally draws on Michel 
Foucault’s (2010) understanding of neoliberalism as a regime of subjectification revolv-
ing around competition. It considers biopolitics, the politics of ‘making live and letting 
die’ (Foucault, 1978, 2003), as a function of the broader neoliberal order, in line with 
Foucault’s argument that neoliberalism should be understood as ‘the general framework 
of biopolitics’ (Foucault, 2010: 22n; see also Vatter, 2014: 163).
My goal in this article is to provide an alternative account of the resilience of neolib-
eralism. Those perspectives that focus on its distinctive qualities (adaptability, capacity 
to incorporate dissent, internal coherence, etc.) implicitly assume that neoliberalism is 
the dominant form of modern governmental rationality. On the other hand, those per-
spectives that focus on the capacity of neoliberalism to produce resilient subjects reduce 
biopolitics to a dimension of neoliberalism. My contention is that modern governmental-
ity — the ensemble of meanings, significations and practices actively deployed to govern 
populations — encompasses two complementary and mutually reinforcing forms of 
rationality: neoliberalism and biopolitics. Whereas neoliberalism rests on the principles 
of competition, inequality and ‘governing for the market’ (Foucault, 2010), biopolitics 
relies on logics of care of the population and racism towards those who threaten its sur-
vival and well-being (Foucault, 2003). Moving from this perspective, I argue that the 
resilience of neoliberalism should be accounted for as a product not just of the distinctive 
qualities of neoliberalism, including its capacity to produce resilient subjects, but also of 
biopolitical rationalities that contribute to regulate, modulate and govern the uncertain-
ties and risks stemming from the neoliberalization of life, and, in particular, neoliberal-
ism’s inclination to produce crises. I will thus argue that biopolitics cannot be reduced to 
a dimension of neoliberalism. Biopolitical governmental rationalities govern crises and 
ensure the resilience of the neoliberal project through technologies of care of the popula-
tion and biopolitical racism that partially offset neoliberal dynamics by projecting their 
cost onto ‘inferior’ populations. An exclusive focus on neoliberal rationalities overlooks 
how governing the resilience of neoliberalism entails intervening on the biological con-
tinuum of life by dividing human beings into competing species/races and normalizing 
the view that the death of ‘the inferior race … will make life in general healthier’ 
(Foucault, 2003: 255).
In order to advance these arguments, the discussion proceeds in three main steps. 
First, I provide a brief overview of existing accounts of the resilience of neoliberalism 
and emphasize how they either neglect biopolitics or confine it to a dimension of the 
neoliberal order. Second, drawing on and partially challenging Michel Foucault, I dis-
cuss how neoliberalism and biopolitics may be considered two complementary govern-
mental rationalities and how biopolitical rationalities of care and racism contribute to 
governing the growing risk and uncertainty stemming from the neoliberalization of life. 
Third, I explore how biopolitical rationalities of care and racism have been deployed to 
govern the neoliberal crisis of the Greek sovereign debt and further promote the neolib-
eral financialized life of the European population.
This analysis aims to contribute to three interrelated growing fields of research, 
namely, cultural and critical international political economy, the resilience of neoliberal-
ism, and the study of neoliberalism and biopolitics. To this end, it strives to articulate a 
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novel perspective to analyse the relationship between neoliberalism and biopolitics and 
develop an alternative interpretation of the governmentality of the Greek debt crisis. 
Indirectly, this article can also be read as a contribution to governmentality studies. This 
heterogeneous body of scholarship has either understood biopolitics as a dimension of 
neoliberalism and neglected the importance of biopolitical racism as an autonomous 
source of governmental rationality (see, for instance, Burchell et al., 1991; Miller and 
Rose, 2008; Bröckling et al., 2010), or acknowledged that biopolitics cannot ‘be reduced 
to the logics of a particular liberal governmentality’ (Nadesan, 2008: 4; see also Dean, 
2010: 120), but nonetheless paid very limited attention to biopolitical racism. Although 
I do not explicitly engage with this literature — which has not specifically tackled the 
question of the resilience of neoliberalism — I will emphasize the importance of national 
boundaries and biopolitical racism in governing ‘the economic fates of citizens within a 
national territory’ (Miller and Rose, 2008: 89). In particular, I will argue that governing 
‘the lives of individuals in liberal societies’ entails not just nurturing neoliberal mecha-
nisms of competition as frameworks of self-government in a new economic landscape in 
which the economy is no longer ‘co-extensive’ with the boundaries of a nation-state 
(Miller and Rose, 2008: 89, 95), but also caring for the population and drawing the line 
between who must live and who must die according to logics of biopolitical racism 
within, but possibly more importantly across, national boundaries.
The resilience of neoliberalism: Existing explanations
Neoliberalism has been variously defined as an economic theory, a political philosophy, 
an ideology, a socio-political project and a governmental rationality characterized by a 
heterogeneous set of ideas, practices and regimes of power. Neoliberal ideas include: a 
belief in the superior capacity of markets over states to create and allocate wealth; the 
view that states should be scaled back in order to free up markets; the notion that growth 
can be promoted through competition, privatization, deregulation and financialization; a 
belief in the individual as a source of human capital, and in inequality as a reflection of 
one’s endowment of human capital and as a force which can promote entrepreneurship; 
and the view that all relations can be analysed and measured in economic cost/benefit 
terms. These ideas have translated into a varied set of practices, such as fiscal discipline, 
austerity, debt conditionality, structural adjustments, the removal of trade barriers, the 
commodification of goods and services, the privatization of profits and socialization of 
losses, the retrenchment of the welfare state and privatization of welfare provisions, the 
financialization of the economy and everyday life, labour flexibility, and the race to the 
bottom in labour standards. These practices have resulted in multiple regimes of power 
geared towards the restoration of class power through the progressive dismantlement of 
social provisions, mechanisms of upward redistribution, dynamics of accumulation and 
dispossession, the exploitation of labour, the extraction of surplus from life, and the 
transfer of wealth from the periphery to the centre, and from the ‘South’ to the ‘North’.
Irrespective of how neoliberalism is understood, its ideas and practices — particularly 
financialization and deregulation — have been widely regarded as the main culprits of 
the 2007/2008 global financial crisis. However, despite this abysmal failure, neoliberal-
ism has not ‘merely survived’ the crisis, but actually ‘thrived’ (Schmidt and Thatcher, 
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2013: xvi). In order to account for this puzzling resilience, existing scholarship has pur-
sued two main routes of inquiry. A first group of scholars has focused on the distinctive 
qualities of neoliberalism, and, in particular, on ‘the generality, diversity, and mutability 
of neo-liberal ideas’, which have often resulted in gaps between neoliberal rhetoric and 
practice (Schmidt and Thatcher, 2013: xix). A second group of scholars has focused on 
the biopolitical capacity of neoliberalism to produce resilient subjects. In the remainder 
of this section, I provide a brief overview of these two perspectives and introduce the key 
argument of this article, namely, that these approaches, although extremely insightful, 
either fail to problematize the role of biopolitics or fail to conceptualize it as a comple-
mentary governmental rationality that plays a key role in governing the resilience of 
neoliberalism.
For Vivien Schmidt and Mark Thatcher (2013: 27), the amorphous, protean and adapt-
able nature of neoliberalism has been essential for its resilience. Neoliberalism has una-
shamedly progressed ‘from hostility against the state to the desire for a strong state’, 
from deregulation to re-regulation, ‘from passive reduction of social spending and job 
protections to active use of welfare to promote market efficiency’. Similarly, Jamie Peck 
(2010: 106) highlights how neoliberalism has shifted ‘from structural adjustment to good 
governance, from budget cuts to regulation-by-audit … from privatization to public–
private partnership, from greed-is-good to markets-with-morals’. These multiple and 
contradictory manifestations have led many scholars to question the very notion of neo-
liberalism and the extent to which it may have become a buzzword that, in the attempt to 
capture under a single conceptual lens many disparate phenomena, has been ‘stretched 
too far to be productive as a critical analytical tool’ (Clarke, 2008: 135). However, as 
Peck, Theodore and Brenner (2010) suggest, the strength of neoliberalism lies precisely 
in its capacity to adapt and colonize different social environments. Accordingly, they 
argue that neoliberalism should be understood as an incomplete socio-political project 
that ‘exists in an essentially parasitical relationship with those extant social formations 
with which it has an antagonistic relationship, such as state socialism, social democracy, 
or neoconservative authoritarianism’ (Peck et al., 2010: 104). The result is that there is 
no clear separation between neoliberalism and its opponents. From this perspective, the 
resilience of neoliberalism reflects the latter’s capacity to change, adapt and co-opt 
different and often contending ideas and social formations, thus turning itself into an 
elusive target for opposing forces.
Several scholars have pointed out how the variable and adaptable nature of neoliberal-
ism often translates into a fundamental incoherence between its theoretical assumptions 
and practical implementation, which conceals neoliberalism’s oppressive and exploita-
tive nature. Marxist scholar David Harvey (2010: 10) has discussed how ‘[o]ne of the 
basic pragmatic principles that emerged in the 1980s’, namely, the idea that ‘state power 
should protect financial institutions at all costs’, blatantly contradicts the notions of non-
interference and self-regulating markets prescribed by orthodox neoliberalism. Similarly, 
Colin Crouch (2011: viii) has stressed the tension between the neoliberal advocacy of the 
competitive market as the most efficient system for the production and allocation of 
wealth, and the neoliberal implementation of a regime of governance that has favoured 
the monopolistic ‘dominance of public life by the giant corporation’. Philip Mirowski 
(2013) has advanced a complementary critique. Although neoliberal advocates have 
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regularly targeted the state as a bureaucratic burden that compresses individual freedoms 
and distorts the efficient functioning of the market, their ‘primary ambition … is to rede-
fine the shape and functions of the state, not to destroy it’ (Mirowski, 2013: 48). A strong 
state is essential to uphold, defend and guarantee the existence and functioning of the 
market.
What Harvey’s, Crouch’s and Mirowski’s critiques share is the proposition that the 
neoliberal gap between theory and practice has enabled neoliberal ideas and their carri-
ers, that is, economic and financial elites, to ‘capture’ part of the media, intellectuals, 
political parties and, ultimately, state power. This perspective is central to post-Keynesian 
and Marxist approaches to the ‘governance of the global financial crisis’ (Langley, 2015: 
19) and the resilience of neoliberalism. It is well summarized by Harvey’s (2010: 115) 
argument that neoliberal ‘capitalism has to create external powers in order to save itself 
from its own internal contradictions’, namely, its innate tendency to over-accumulation, 
speculation and crisis. The state has therefore been ‘captured’, that is, turned into the tool 
of the ruling financial elites in order to ensure the resilience of neoliberalism.
Martijn Konings (2016: 269) has questioned this ‘capture model’ and argued that 
the fact that the 2008 crisis has resulted in ‘relatively few restrictive regulations on 
financial institutions’ is a product of neoliberalism’s capacity to frame political action 
as inherently speculative. Konings’s view deserves particular attention because, unlike 
the aforementioned perspectives, it employs a Foucauldian approach. As I shall discuss 
in greater detail in the next section, according to Foucault, and unlike the scholars so far 
discussed, neoliberalism entails not the domination of the market over politics, but the 
economization of the state, that is, the idea that the state should be ruled, modelled and 
governed as a large corporation. For Konings, the behaviour of the neoliberal state 
should be analysed through the lenses of Friedrich Hayek’s neoliberal theory. Hayek 
considered that the state could not engineer social order since it could not ‘place itself 
outside the logic of risk and speculation’ (Konings, 2016: 278); therefore, order could 
only emerge as the spontaneous result of self-regulating market forces. Konings (2016: 
277) discusses how the USA’s attempt to regulate ‘banks’ money-creating abilities’ 
resulted in new forms of ‘shadow banking’ that circumvented the regulatory framework. 
This suggests that governments cannot prevent the occasional failures of the market, 
but can manage market crises by converting ‘uncertainty into unambiguous authority’ 
(Konings, 2016: 273).
Accordingly, the governments’ bailout of financial institutions hit by the crisis and 
deemed ‘too big to fail’ should be understood not as inconsistent with neoliberal assump-
tions and as the product of ‘captured’ states, but as a result of the subjectification of states 
into ‘highly speculative’ actors. Governmental institutions, Konings (2016: 274) main-
tains, have not been colonized and hetero-directed by financial elites to purchase their 
toxic assets ‘whose value was fundamentally in doubt’, but have embraced the ‘only 
possible course of action’: protecting ‘the nodal points of the financial system’, that is, 
the banks, in order to safeguard their existence, that is, the existence of the market, which 
is the primary and fundamental task of states in a neoliberal order. This argument high-
lights an important difference between Harvey’s Marxist approach and Konings’s 
Foucauldian approach. Whereas Harvey considers neoliberalism as the ‘retreat’ of poli-
tics and ‘domination of the market’ (see Lemke, 2003: 177) and explains the resilience 
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of neoliberalism as the result of ‘captured states’ saving the market, Konings deems 
neoliberalism as a process of economization of state and society and accounts for the 
resilience of neoliberalism as the product of ‘economized states’ acting in a context of 
uncertainty that turns states into speculative agents and encourages them to adopt a deci-
sionist — ‘Schmittian’ — understanding of sovereign power.
Konings’s perspective has the merit of overcoming the traditional Marxist divide 
between states and markets. Nonetheless, his approach shares with Harvey and the other 
scholars so far discussed an underlying neglect of the role played by biopolitical ration-
alities in the resilience of neoliberalism. This neglect is particularly evident in Konings’s 
almost ‘technical’ account. Working within the framework of the economization of state 
and society (hence beyond the idea of the market oppressing the political and social life 
of the individual), but without considering the biopolitical implications of this economi-
zation, leads Konings to reduce the question of the resilience of neoliberalism to a prob-
lem of ‘governing the system’ in a complex framework of uncertainty. This raises 
questions about how the resilience of neoliberalism may impact on the life/biopolitical 
life of the population and, more broadly, about the role that biopolitics may play in the 
resilience of neoliberalism.
A growing group of scholars has tackled these questions by analysing neoliberalism 
as a biopolitical regime of subjectification mired in the production of resilient subjects. 
The notion of resilience has its origin in the 1970s’ ecology literature and accounts for 
the capacity of complex ecosystems to withstand and adapt to threats, shocks and crises 
that may undermine their existence (Evans and Reid, 2013; Walker and Cooper, 2011). 
Over the last few years, this concept has received increasing attention in the International 
Relations literature on crisis management. In particular, numerous scholars have explored 
how resilience is becoming a defining feature of a neoliberal governmental regime that 
is progressively shifting from equilibrium to adaptation. According to Mitchell Dean 
(2014), this shift is a product of a qualitative transformation of neoliberalism. Marked by 
a relentless pattern of crises, poor economic growth and growing inequality, neoliberal-
ism is casting off ‘its supposition of economic equilibrium and its triumphalist narratives 
of the welfare-generating properties of the omniscient market and simply seeks to fash-
ion ways to make individuals, communities, systems and organizations fit for rigors of 
the catastrophe yet to come’ (Dean, 2014: 161). The notion of resilience thus entails an 
ultimate acceptance of the view that the world can neither be changed, nor mastered; 
hence, the only rational strategy for survival is to adapt to externally imposed changes 
(Joseph, 2013; Walker and Cooper, 2011).
This neoliberal regime of governance operates a powerful ideological shift of respon-
sibility. Failure, poverty, marginalization and exclusion are no longer the responsibility 
of governments as global economic and financial processes are beyond the capacity of 
states to manage them. Individuals are ultimately responsible for their own successes 
and failures, which become a result of their own resilience, namely, their capacity to 
adapt to the neoliberal market-based order. Neoliberalism as a governmental rationality 
based on the construction of resilient subjects insulates neoliberalism from potential 
attacks and contributes to its very resilience. The crises of neoliberalism are no longer 
the outcome of a governmental regime, a political philosophy and economic system 
based on logics of inequality, accumulation and dispossession that should be opposed, 
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but rather the outcome of externally given conditions emerging from the complexity of 
the neoliberal order.
This approach has the merit of integrating biopolitics into the analysis of the resil-
ience of neoliberalism. In line with Foucault’s (2010: 22n) idea of neoliberalism ‘as the 
general framework of biopolitics’, this view rests on an understanding of biopolitics as 
primarily about the production of subjectivity (Hardt and Negri, 2009). Accordingly, the 
primary goal of biopolitical power is ‘to incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and 
organize the forces under it’ in order to integrate the population into neoliberal ‘systems 
of efficient and economic controls’ by prompting the ‘the adjustment of the accumulation 
of men to that of capital, [and] the joining of the growth of human groups to the expan-
sion of productive forces’ (Foucault, 1978: 136, 139, 141). Biopolitics thus concerns the 
production of entrepreneurial and strategizing subjects that, confronted with a world that 
cannot be changed, are normalized into the acceptance of resilience as the only possible 
rational course of life. This results not just in their inscription into mechanisms of neo-
liberal competition, accumulation and inequality, but in their construction as neoliberal 
subjects, whose resilience is ultimately the resilience of the neoliberal order.
Although powerful and insightful, this perspective rests on a narrow understanding of 
biopolitics as a process of construction of subjectivities instrumental for the reproduction 
of neoliberalism. As I shall discuss in the next section, biopolitics also encompasses log-
ics of care and racism that govern the divide between who must live and who must die 
and that can be considered independent sources of governmental rationality. In order to 
advance this argument, in the next section, I will first explore the relationship between 
neoliberalism and biopolitics and then how biopolitical rationalities may intervene in 
neoliberal dynamics and contribute to governing the resilience of neoliberalism.
The biopolitical governance of neoliberalism
Foucault’s account of the relationship between neoliberalism and biopolitics is rather 
puzzling. In his 1978–1979 lectures at the Collège de France, The Birth of Biopolitics 
(Foucault, 2010), Foucault argues that neoliberalism represents a new governmental 
rationality based on the principle of minimum government and the self-limitation of 
governmental reason. It marks the emergence of a new form of subjectivity revolving 
around the notion of homo oeconomicus and the reconstitution of society around the 
concepts of market, competition and enterprise. Liberalism and neoliberalism, Foucault 
(2010: 22n) contends, should be understood ‘as the general framework of biopolitics’. 
However, despite this statement and the very title of his lectures, Foucault hardly men-
tions, let alone explores, the concept of biopolitics. The latter had been introduced in his 
1975–1976 lectures, Society Must be Defended (Foucault, 2003), and in The History of 
Sexuality: Volume 1 (Foucault, 1978 [1976]). Here, Foucault characterizes biopolitics as 
a transformation in the logic of power, from the traditional sovereign power to kill and 
let live, to the biopolitical power to make live and let die. The main goal of biopolitics, 
Foucault contends, is to ‘take care’, namely, to ensure the growth, expansion and flour-
ishing of life under power’s control. Yet, in this rendering of biopolitics, Foucault does 
not mention the notion of neoliberalism at all. This leaves the question open as to how 
the relationship between neoliberalism and biopolitics should be understood.
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In order to address this ‘unsolved puzzle’ (Lemm and Vatter, 2014: 5), I propose to 
start with Foucault’s account of neoliberalism and how it differs from classical liberal-
ism.1 Classical liberalism is linked to the 18th-century emergence of political economy. 
This should be understood as a ‘method of government that can procure the nation’s 
prosperity’ and as a ‘general reflection on the organization, distribution, and limitation of 
powers in a society’ that enthrones the market as the ‘site of the formation of truth’, that 
is, as a measure of the efficacy and validity of governmental action (Foucault, 2010: 13, 
30). Liberal political economy maintains that the market obeys ‘natural’ and ‘spontane-
ous’ mechanisms that the government cannot understand in their totality. These mecha-
nisms contribute to the simultaneous maximization of individual and collective value. 
Adam Smith’s invisible hand — the idea that the interests of society are best served by 
the pursuit of self-interest by rational individual agents in a market free from state inter-
vention — is the paradigmatic illustration of this liberal perspective. For Foucault, the 
metaphor of the invisible hand signals a profound transformation in the meaning and 
scope of sovereign power. It suggests that for the sovereign, it is impossible to have ‘any 
form of overarching gaze which would enable the economic process to be totalized’ 
(Foucault, 2010: 280).
It follows that the sovereign is ontologically ‘ignorant’ about the economy and it is 
precisely this ignorance — and the resulting idea that he should not attempt to ‘pursue 
the collective good’ — that makes possible individual and collective growth (Foucault, 
2010: 280–281). Accordingly, with liberalism, the market emerges as a self-organizing 
entity capable of achieving an equilibrium that maximizes both individual and collective 
interests and requires a limitation of governmental activity. The market thus becomes a 
model of government or, as Foucault (2010: 33) puts it, ‘a site of veridiction for govern-
mental practice’. This means that the measure of liberal governmental activity is no 
longer legitimacy or illegitimacy, but economic success or failure. Finally, in the liberal 
governmental order, the ‘subject of rights’, or what Wendy Brown (2015) calls homo 
politicus, is complemented by a new emerging form of subjectivity, homo oeconomicus, 
the rational and self-oriented individual who seeks the pursuit of his interests in the 
market through ‘truck, barter and exchange’ (Smith, 1957 [1776]: 12). Liberalism thus 
rests on a clear demarcation between the sphere of politics, where the individual is ruled 
as a ‘subject of rights’, and the economic sphere, where he is governed as a ‘subject of 
interests’ (Foucault, 2010: 273–276).
Neoliberalism inherits many ideas from liberalism — including the notion of self-
regulating markets and the related principle of the self-limitation of governmental 
activity — but also introduces three key innovations. First, the market is not a natural 
given revolving around dynamics of exchange, but an artificial and fragile environment 
centred on logics of competition. Accordingly, the market requires ‘an active govern-
mentality’ (Foucault, 2010: 121), that is, an interventionist state, to support and protect 
its existence and proper functioning. For Foucault (2010: 121), in the neoliberal order, 
‘one must govern for the market, rather than because of the market’, to the effect that the 
market becomes the all-encompassing framework of meanings and significations that 
reshapes the sense and purpose of state and society. It follows that the task of govern-
ments is ‘to intervene on society as such, in its fabric and depth … so that competitive 
mechanisms can play a regulatory role at every moment and every point in society’ in 
 by guest on November 22, 2016ejt.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
10 European Journal of International Relations 
order to achieve ‘a general regulation of society by the market’ (Foucault, 2010: 145). 
The thrust of neoliberalism as a governmental rationality is letting individuals govern 
themselves by governing the overarching framework of meanings and practices in which 
individuals operate — hence, by governing the ‘conduct of conduct’ (Foucault, 1991) 
through the normalization of the principle of market competition.
Second, and accordingly, neoliberalism engenders a process of ‘economization of 
society and politics’, whereby the ‘exercise of political power’ is ‘modelled on the prin-
ciples of a market economy’ (Foucault, 2010: 131), and the market, understood as ‘an 
order of normative reason’ (Brown, 2015: 16, 14), acquires a ‘power of formalization for 
both the state and society’ (Foucault, 2010: 117). A crucial implication of this process is 
that speculation and risk are no longer confined to the market, but become general orien-
tations of life. This is reflected in a profound transformation of subjectivity. Homo oeco-
nomicus is no longer confined to the sphere of the market, as in classical liberalism, but 
occupies all spheres of human existence. Neoliberal life thus turns into a speculative 
enterprise aimed at maximizing one’s own human capital through logics of competition, 
accumulation and strategic positioning (Brown, 2015: 17).
Third, this speculative approach to life entails a significant exposure to risk and the 
possibility of failure (poverty, social exclusion and marginalization). For Foucault, the 
risks stemming from the neoliberalization of life cannot be managed through their social-
ization. This would run counter to the principles of competition and minimum govern-
ment, namely, the idea that governments should ‘not obstruct the interplay of individual 
interests’ because they do not possess any ‘overarching gaze’ that would enable a better 
pursuit of ‘growth’ (Foucault, 2010: 280). Accordingly, Foucault (2010: 144) contends, 
ensuring growth is the only way to enable individuals to confront the risks stemming 
from the neoliberalization of life, as growth, while not ‘providing individuals with a 
social cover for risks’, accords everyone an ‘economic space within which they can take 
on and confront risks’. Neoliberalism thus encompasses a greater exposure to risk to the 
effect that ‘live dangerously’ becomes a defining ethos of neoliberalism (Foucault, 2010: 
66, 329).
The critique of resilience discussed in the previous section focuses on this aspect 
of neoliberalism: ‘individuals are constantly exposed to danger, or rather, they are con-
ditioned to experience their situation, their life, their present, and their future as contain-
ing danger’ (Foucault, 2010: 66). Accordingly, individuals are forced to subjectify 
themselves as entrepreneurial and resilient subjects in order to withstand a neoliberal 
life loaded with uncertainty and risk and deprived of social protections. Moreover, argu-
ably, the resilience required to confront risk is even greater than that anticipated by 
Foucault because neoliberalism (partly due to its growing financialization) has proved 
increasingly unable to generate growth (Brown, 2015: 10; see also Harvey, 2005, 2011). 
According to the critical scholarship on resilience previously discussed, biopower 
primarily concerns the construction of entrepreneurial and resilient subjects who may 
be inscribed in and become part of the neoliberal order.
This important perspective overlooks a central task of biopower: taking care of the 
population by fostering its flourishing and well-being through a series of technologies 
that may govern ‘aleatory events’ and ‘dangers’ (Foucault, 2003: 246, 252). Although 
biopolitics has often been understood as a security apparatus (see, for instance, Dillon 
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and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008), Foucault and subsequent scholarship have not explicitly 
framed it as instrumental to secure the population from the risks of neoliberalism. 
Nonetheless, Foucault (2003: 246, 254) argues that biopolitics aims to ‘establish an equi-
librium, maintain an average, establish a sort of homeostasis, and compensate for varia-
tions within this general population and its aleatory field’ in order to ‘improve life … 
prolong its duration … improve its chances … avoid accidents, and … compensate for 
failings’ by installing ‘security mechanisms … around the random element inherent in a 
population of living beings’. This argument invites us to consider the possibility of 
biopolitics as a governmental rationality distinct from neoliberalism. Its primary task 
would be to compensate for the risks and failures engendered by neoliberalism through 
the establishment of a series of institutions and practices — such as hygiene rules, pat-
terns of saving, consumption and reproduction, health-insurance systems, welfare provi-
sions, pensions, labour standards, women’s and children’s rights, trade unions, education, 
environmental regulations, financial regulations, and (as I shall discuss in the next sec-
tion) bailouts of financial institutions at times of crisis — which play a key role in gov-
erning the resilience of neoliberalism.
In order to explore this perspective, it is useful to consider the relationship between 
neoliberalism and biopolitics through Karl Polanyi’s (2001 [1944]) thesis of the ‘double 
movement’. Polanyi (2001 [1944]) considered that the notion of the market as a self-
regulating entity central to the economy was an artificial creation of governments, whose 
constant intervention was essential to sustain its viability. The notion of self-regulating 
markets has caused their social disembeddedness, namely, markets act as autonomous 
entities that increasingly shape social relations. According to Polanyi (2001 [1944]), this 
has prompted a series of countermovements, primarily engineered by governments, but 
also by other institutions within society, such as trade unions, focused on the care of the 
population and its well-being, and thus aimed at the social re-embedding of markets. 
These countermovements include the introduction of social protections (such as welfare 
provisions, labour standards, education, health programmes) essential to govern the mar-
ket economy that, ‘if left to evolve according to its own laws, would create great and 
permanent evils’ (Polanyi, 2001 [1944]: 136). These evils represent not just moral con-
cerns, but also a problem of survival of the market economy. Leaving ‘the faith of soil 
and people to the market’, Polanyi (2001 [1944]: 137) observed, ‘would be tantamount 
to annihilating them’, as this would result, for instance, in the brutal exploitation of 
labour forces (Guizzo and Vigo de Lima, 2015: 5). Caring for the population and their 
well-being is essential for the preservation of the market economy, which would other-
wise collapse under the weight of its own success and contradictions. The dialectical 
process of social disembedding and re-embedding of the market is thus, for Polanyi, a 
defining feature of modern capitalist economy.
There are strong similarities between Polanyi’s and Foucault’s understandings of the 
market, and between Polanyi’s idea of countermovements aimed at the social re-embed-
ding of the market and Foucault’s notion of biopolitics as a set of technologies of power 
aimed at governing populations by installing security mechanisms fostering life. Indeed, 
in a rare and recent attempt to explore the connections between Foucault and Polanyi, 
Danielle Guizzo and Iara Vigo de Lima (2015: 3) argue that ‘the social disembeddedness 
of markets claimed by Polanyi had the birth of biopolitical practices as one of its effects’. 
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There is, however, also an important difference between Foucault and Polanyi. Polanyi 
described the laissez-faire movement aimed at expanding the market and the protective 
countermovement aimed at ensuring its social re-embedding as opposing forces. In par-
ticular, Polanyi (2001 [1944]: 138, 136) considered that countermovements expressed 
‘the principle of social protection aiming at the conservation of man and nature’ and, as 
such, they were ‘incompatible with the self-regulation of the market, and thus with the 
market system itself’. For Polanyi, the double movement epitomized an underlying ten-
sion between market and life. For Foucault, neoliberalism and biopolitics mark an over-
coming of this tension: the former through a process of economization of the political 
and the social domain; the latter through the production of life already imbued with 
market values (such as competition, productivity and entrepreneurship).
Accordingly, a joint Foucauldian–Polanyian reading suggests that the goal of biopo-
litical countermovements may be the protection not just of life, but of neoliberal life, 
namely, a life that is already inscribed in and draws its meaning from the neoliberal 
market. Protecting life would thus require protecting the neoliberal market, which is the 
condition of possibility of life. This life–market compenetration suggests that the neolib-
eral disembedding of the market and biopolitical countermovements should be consid-
ered complementary rather than competing rationalities of government, and that 
biopolitical countermovements/governmental rationalities may play a key role in gov-
erning the resilience of neoliberalism. This interaction brings to the fore a perspective 
that differs considerably from those discussed in the previous section. It highlights a 
different goal of governmentality that transcends purely neoliberal rationalities: not just 
‘saving the market’ (Harvey), or ‘governing the system’ (Konings), but governing neo-
liberal life, namely, ensuring the resilience of neoliberalism by securing neoliberal life 
through a series of countermovements/biopolitical interventions that transcend the mere 
construction of resilient subjects.
To better appreciate the role of biopolitics in governing the resilience of neoliberal-
ism, it is worth considering a potential counterargument, namely, neoliberalism’s touted 
dismantlement of the quintessential biopolitical security apparatus: the welfare state. 
However, those analyses that lament a shift from public pensions, universal insurance 
and pay rises to private investments in pension funds, individual insurance and consumer 
credit (Lazzarato, 2015: 60) overlook how these trends have been met by a series of 
Polanyian countermovements aimed at reintroducing biopolitical mechanisms of care of 
the population. The thesis of the ‘compensatory state’ (Glenn, 2007, 2009), for instance, 
maintains that neoliberalism has resulted not in the shrinking of governments, but in their 
expansion (measured in terms of social expenditures) in order to ‘compensate’ for the 
negative effects of neoliberal globalization, such as growing competition and the mobil-
ity of capital, the race to the bottom in labour standards, labour flexibility, and unemploy-
ment caused by industrial relocations (Glenn, 2007: 132–136). Accordingly, neoliberal 
‘[g]lobalization may well require big, not small, government’ (Rodrik, 1996: 26) in order 
to provide both active labour market policies — such as ‘retraining programs, public 
employment services, targeting of problematic populations such as school dropouts’ — 
and passive social programmes — such as employment protections, unemployment ben-
efits, and retirement policies (Spilerman, 2009: 78). The ‘compensatory state’ thesis 
highlights how the growing uncertainty and risks caused by the process of neoliberal 
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globalization has pushed societies to demand and receive ‘a larger government role as 
the price of exposing themselves to greater amounts of external risk’ (Rodrik, 1997: 65). 
This strengthens ‘political incentives for governments to use the policy instruments of 
the state to mitigate market dislocations by redistributing wealth and risk’ (Garret, 1998: 
789; see also Glenn, 2007: 134). This compensatory dimension should be understood not 
as a complete biopolitical offsetting of neoliberal policies, but as a way of smoothing 
and governing the harshest effects of neoliberalism, and thus as a way of governing the 
resilience of neoliberalism by preserving neoliberal life.
Of course, it must be stressed that the compensatory state thesis primarily applies to 
wealthy industrialized countries. Developing countries have, in fact, witnessed a signifi-
cant decline in their welfare expenditures (Glenn, 2009), which is indicative of their 
lower capacity to govern neoliberalism. This North–South divide may suggest that the 
resilience of neoliberalism in the South is primarily the outcome of an external imposi-
tion. This raises the more general question as to whether the biopolitical governance of 
neoliberalism enacted by the wealthiest and more powerful states — whether through 
welfare expenditures or other measures, such as the bailout of financial institutions, as I 
shall discuss in the next section — may result in a ‘transfer’ or ‘projection’ of neoliberal 
policies to less wealthy countries. This possibility needs to be considered in relation to 
the very ambivalence of biopolitics. As Foucault (2003: 254) observes, biopolitics is not 
an unqualified attempt to care for the wealth and well-being of people, but the specific 
endeavour to promote the life and well-being of the population under power’s control. 
This care also requires protecting the population from other populations — the ‘inferior 
species’, to use Foucault’s (2003: 255) terminology — that threaten its possibility to 
flourish, proliferate and expand. According to Foucault (2003: 254), then, biopolitics 
inscribes racism ‘in the mechanisms of the State’, turning it into an essential mechanism 
of state power.
The modern biopolitical racism described by Foucault differs from traditional notions 
of racism that ascribed negative qualities to certain ethnic groups and portrayed them as 
inferior. Indeed, modern biopolitical racism ‘is not merely an irrational prejudice, a form 
of socio-political discrimination, or an ideological motive in a political doctrine; rather, 
it is a form of government that is designed to manage a population’ (Rasmussen, 2011: 
34). It is a biopolitical governmental rationality that introduces ‘a break into the domain 
of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die’ 
(Foucault, 2003: 254). In this biological framework, Foucault (2003: 255) reminds us:
[t]he fact that the other dies does not mean simply that I live in the sense that his death guarantees 
my safety; the death of the other, the death of the bad race, of the inferior race … is something 
that will make life in general healthier: healthier and purer.
In the next section, I will expand this analysis of biopolitical racism with reference to the 
governmentality of the Greek sovereign debt crisis. In particular, I will discuss how 
biopolitical rationalities of care and racism have been deployed to govern the Greek 
crisis and the resilience of neoliberalism, namely, by preventing the crisis from under-
mining the stability of the European banking system and, therefore, the neoliberal life, 
wealth and well-being of the European population.
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The biopolitical governance of the Greek sovereign debt 
crisis
As has been observed (Tsoukala, 2013), two main narratives have characterized the pop-
ular debate on the causes of the Greek sovereign debt crisis. The first has focused on the 
profligacy of the Greek population, the Greek state’s incapacity to comply with the 
requirements of the European Stability and Growth Pact, and its irresponsibility for fal-
sifying its economic, financial and fiscal situation in order to join the European Union 
(EU). The second narrative has concentrated on the structural limits of the EU, which has 
contributed to create trade imbalances and, at the same time, prevent its nations from 
pursuing an independent monetary policy, such as devaluation, that in the case of Greece, 
would have helped to govern some of the effects of the crisis (Tsoukala, 2013). The 
biopolitical racist narrative of the Greeks as a lazy, incompetent and greedy population 
(see Arnade, 2015), which, according to Angela Merkel, should have not been allowed 
into the EU in the first place (The Guardian, 2010), has emerged as the dominant one. 
This narrative has portrayed the Greeks as responsible for their own condition, for threat-
ening the stability of the EU and the well-being of its population, and for posing ‘as big 
a risk to the global economy and financial markets as the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
did in September 2008’ (The Guardian, 2010). For the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) Secretary General Ángel Gurría, the Greek debt 
crisis was spreading ‘like Ebola. When you realise you have it you have to cut your leg 
off in order to survive’ (The Guardian, 2010). Fear that the ‘contagion’ of ‘the developed 
world’s most crooked economy’ lying ‘in the cradle of Western civilization’ could trigger 
a ‘domino effect’ that could undermine ‘the very existence of the world’s second biggest 
currency’ (see Tracy, 2012) amplified calls for resolute political interventions.
This powerful narrative of biopolitical stigmatization has been instrumental in justify-
ing the adoption of a series of bailouts conditional upon the implementation of austerity 
measures as a solution to the crisis. In particular, the construction of the Greeks as guilty 
and therefore deserving of punishment (Engdahl, 2015) has contributed to overshadow-
ing the fact that the primary goal of the three bailouts received by Greece was saving 
large European banks that owned most of the Greek sovereign debt, rather than helping 
the Greek economy recover. Since 2010, European governments, the European Central 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (the so-called Troika) have loaned Greece 
€252 billion in order to rescue it from default. However, it is estimated that only 5% of 
the bailout loan has gone to the Greek government to invest in the country and benefit the 
Greek people (Rocholl and Stahmer, 2016). The majority of the loan has been used to 
pay off debt with primarily German and French (and, to a less extent, British, US, Dutch 
and Italian) banks, which were exposed for a total of over €200 billion following the 
extensive purchase of Greek sovereign debt in order to reap the higher yields on bonds 
compared to that offered by other countries in the Eurozone. At the end of 2014, the 
exposure of European and US banks to Greece had shrunk to about €35 billion (Nardelli 
and Merler, 2015; Rocholl and Stahmer, 2016), while Greece had plunged into an even 
deeper recession, with 25% unemployment, over 44% of the Greek population with an 
income below the poverty line, a 35% increase in suicides and ‘the collapse of public 
health and education’ (Hadjimichalis, 2014: 505).
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The narrative of Greek irresponsibility has contributed to overshadowing a key cause 
of the crisis: irresponsible lending. As discussed in the previous section, an essential 
component of neoliberal competition is the acceptance of the risks and dangers that com-
petition may entail, to the extent that, for Foucault (2010: 66), ‘live dangerously’ may 
well be considered the motto of neoliberalism. The Greek bailout, however, relieved 
private actors (the banks) of the business risk that they had deliberately and voluntarily 
undertaken by shifting the risk and its consequences onto the Greek people — and, to a 
lesser extent, onto the European people in the case of insolvency of the Greek state. By 
purchasing Greek bonds, European banks were able to benefit from the higher interest 
rates in the Eurozone while not paying any price for the risk undertaken (a positive rela-
tionship between risk and expected return is, in theory, a central principle of financial 
markets; see, for instance, Chance and Brooks, 2015; Markowitz, 1952; Merton, 1973). 
Their lending was reckless and perfectly rational as it exploited the idea that an EU coun-
try would not default as the EU would ultimately come to its rescue (see Arnade, 2015).
Following Harvey (2005: 29), it could be argued that the fact that lenders, despite 
their reckless and irresponsible behaviour, are spared losses whereas ‘borrowers are 
forced by state and international powers to take on board the cost of debt repayment no 
matter what the consequences for the livelihood and well-being of the local population’ 
highlights how neoliberalism has been able to ‘capture’ sovereign power and use it to solve 
its contradictions and govern its resilience. From this perspective, the Greek crisis is only 
the last of hundreds of crises around the world that have been dealt with by privatizing 
profits and socializing risks, thus contradicting the neoliberal assumption of self-regulating 
markets and resulting in a systemic moral hazard (banks are not responsible for their 
risky behaviours). Following Konings, the Greek bailout can also be considered as part 
of a pattern in which governments step in to bail out financial actors. However, Konings 
would regard this intervention as an expression of the very neoliberal duty of states to 
support the market when mechanisms of self-regulation fail in an economic environment 
in which governments cannot transcend risk (and therefore prevent crises) solely through 
regulations. The Greek debt crisis is a case in point: despite the economic, financial and 
fiscal requirements that Greece had to comply with to join the EU, these were circum-
vented (with the help of investment bank Goldman Sachs), thus laying the foundations 
for the recent crisis. According to Konings (2016: 274), when confronted with a crisis 
whose risk is incalculable, neoliberal governmentality turns the state into a speculative 
agent that embraces a decisionist — ‘Schmittian’ — understanding of sovereign power 
in order to preserve the financial system. It suspends the rule of law and, indeed, the very 
law of the market, and imposes the socialization of private risk/losses, thus guaranteeing 
the resilience of neoliberalism.
Although insightful, these accounts raise an important objection: is it possible to 
understand the Greek bailout — and the resilience of neoliberalism — solely as the out-
come of a neoliberal governmental rationality that mobilizes sovereign power (either 
‘captured’ by neoliberal elites or ‘economized’ by neoliberal rationalities) to save finan-
cial institutions? In particular, Konings offers a more nuanced and sophisticated approach 
than Harvey by arguing that governments have not been ‘captured’ by economic and 
financial elites, but subjectified as economic agents, which leads them to adopt a specu-
lative attitude (purchasing toxic assets, i.e. Greek debt from the banks) in order to 
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preserve the neoliberal system. However, while this argument explains the governmental 
rationality of the bailout, it also neglects its underlying rationality of power, which, for 
Harvey, is crucially represented by the ruling elites using the state to transfer the cost of 
their reckless behaviour onto the population. The approach that I have been advancing in 
this article strives to move beyond both Konings’s and Harvey’s by embracing the 
Foucauldian idea of the economization of the state, yet from the perspective of a biopo-
litical governmental logic (reconsidered in Polanyian terms) concerned with the care and 
well-being of the population. From this angle, the rationale of the bailout was not just 
‘saving the banks’ on behalf of the ruling economic and financial elites or ‘governing the 
system’, but governing neoliberal life by saving European citizens from the risk of finan-
cial instability caused by the European banks’ exposure to Greek sovereign debt. At the 
heart of the bailout, in other words, there was biopolitical care for the life of the European 
population and biopolitical racism towards the Greeks, implicitly constructed as non-
Europeans and deemed as a threat to the life and well-being of the Europeans.
The dominant narrative was that the Greeks had lied about their economic and finan-
cial credentials, overindulged in welfare spending (including ‘lavish pensions’) and 
eventually infected with their toxic debt the ‘monetary and financial lifeblood of the 
[European] economic body’ (see Langley, 2015: 68). The metaphor of money, finance 
and, more generally, capital as ‘the lifeblood that flows through the body politic of all 
those societies we call capitalist’ (Harvey, 2010: vii) draws on a deep-seated social 
imaginary that dates back to Aristotle (Langley, 2015: 68) and helps to understand how 
the financial threat was ultimately a biological threat. By infecting the bloodstream of 
Europe, Greece also infected its heart, namely, the banks, endowed with the task of 
pumping blood/money. The Greek crisis thus threatened to slow down or possibly even 
suspend the flow of blood, prompting a full-blown crisis of neoliberal capitalism and 
neoliberal life.
This argument highlights the biopolitical centrality of banking to the life, security 
and well-being of the population. As Paul Langley (2015: 81) observes in relation to the 
2008 financial crisis, this was conceptualized and governed not as a crisis concerning 
the functioning, reliability and efficiency of the market, but primarily ‘as a problem of 
solvency of banking’. Accordingly, the main goal was not to reform the market, but to 
restore circulation in order to allow the continuation and reproduction of the neoliberal 
‘financialized life’ (Langley, 2015: 98). The ‘affective’ compenetration of banking and 
life, Langley continues, was highlighted by a number of leading politicians and bureau-
crats. Hank Paulson, then US Secretary of the Treasury, warned about the link between 
‘a frozen financial system’ and the American people’s ‘reduced values in their retirement 
and investment accounts’ (cited in Langley, 2015: 98). Gordon Brown, then UK Prime 
Minister, was even more explicit:
[b]anks aren’t just economic entities, they are woven into the fabric of all our lives, vital to 
savers, to mortgage holders, to businesses and to ordinary families everywhere. And this isn’t 
abstract, this is about the conversations mothers and fathers will be having on their sofas tonight 
once they have put their children to bed. (Cited in Langley, 2015: 98)
Like the 2008 financial crisis, the Greek sovereign debt crisis was conceptualized and 
governed ‘as a problem of solvency of banking’. Unlike the 2008 financial crisis, there 
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was no need to publically stress the banking–life connection in order to justify the bailout 
of private companies with public money. The possibility to identify a clear biopolitical 
cause and threat, the Greek population, provided legitimacy for a punitive bailout that 
established a biopolitical connection between the need for Greece to embrace austerity 
and the survival and well-being of the European population.
This perspective challenges the idea that the Greek bailout, instrumental for govern-
ing the resilience of neoliberalism, was purely a matter of neoliberal governmental 
rationality that had either ‘captured’ or ‘economized’ sovereign power. It suggests that a 
complementary governmental rationality, biopolitics, prompted European states to res-
cue the banks in order to secure the life of the European population by transferring ine-
quality, poverty and social devastation to the Greek people. Accordingly, the Greek 
bailout saw political power, that is, European states, acting as biopolitical agents of 
mediation, coordination and regulation that intervened to govern a neoliberal crisis. To 
reprise a previous quote by Foucault (2003: 246), European governments intervened to 
‘establish an equilibrium, maintain an average, establish a sort of homeostasis, and com-
pensate for variations within this general population and its aleatory field’. Ultimately, it 
was not just neoliberalism, but a combined neoliberal–biopolitical apparatus, that intro-
duced ‘a break into the domain of life that is under power’s control’: the break between 
Europe — which had to continue to flourish, proliferate and expand — and the Greek 
people — left with the social devastation of an overwhelming debt. While my argument 
suggests a convergence between neoliberalism and biopolitics — bailing out the banks 
secured the market and the population — this should not obscure that the bailout repre-
sents a Polanyian ‘countermovement’ aimed at re-embedding and partially offsetting the 
potentially destructive effects of the neoliberal market in order to ensure the preservation 
and continuation of (neoliberal) life. Hence, whereas Konings deems bailouts solely as 
the result of governmental rationalities internal to neoliberalism, which prompt states to 
turn into speculative actors, my contention is that they should also, if not primarily, be 
considered an instantiation of biopolitical rationalities of care and racism.
This analysis highlights the centrality of biopolitical racism for the resilience and repro-
duction of neoliberal life to the effect that biopolitical racism should be understood as 
a governmental rationality central to the biopolitical-neoliberal apparatus of governance. 
As Nobel prize-winning economist Paul Krugman (cited in Trumbo and Buxton, 2016) 
remarked: ‘The drive for austerity [imposed upon Greece] was about using the crisis, not 
solving it’. Biopolitical racism was not just a ‘response’ to the crisis, but an opportunity to 
further consolidate neoliberal forms of governance though practices of neoliberal dispos-
session. Thus, as part of the bailout deal, Greece has had to agree to a privatization memo-
randum2 that commits it to ‘sell off €50 billion in public assets’ — from airports to ports, 
from landscapes to service utilities such as railways and water supply networks — in order 
to raise cash to repay his debts (Rankin and Smith, 2015). This controversial plan reflects 
not just the European belief of Greek guilt, which requires Greece to renounce its material 
wealth to amend its sins,3 but also a neoliberal belief in the benefits of privatization as an 
effective way of reducing public debt and ‘increasing the efficiency of companies’ and ‘the 
competitiveness of the economy’ (European Commission, 2015).
However, as a result of the privatization process, Greece has sold most of Piraeus, 
Greece’s largest port, to Chinese state-owned company Cosco. Similarly, Greece’s 14 
most profitable regional airports have been sold to German airport operator Fraport, 
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majority owned by the German state. Hence, privatization has not meant the transfer of 
public assets to private owners, but the dispossession of Greek public assets by foreign 
capital and the transfer of wealth from Greece to other countries. Yet, the most contro-
versial aspect of the memorandum concerns the privatization of water supply networks. 
Germany has strongly pushed Greece to sell its water utilities precisely at a time when 
many European and, in particular, German cities, including Berlin, are ‘bringing water 
services back under public control in frustration at rising prices and declining service 
delivery’ (Mathiesen, 2015; Trumbo and Buxton, 2016). For Harvey (2005), this double 
standard reveals a long-standing underlying hypocrisy at the heart of neoliberalism — a 
gap between theoretical assumptions and their practical implementation — which has 
been instrumental for turning privatization (specifically, forcing countries experiencing 
a crisis to let go of their public assets at sale price) into a primary tool of ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’. From the perspective advanced in this article, Germany’s attitude should 
be understood not just as hypocrisy, but as an expression of the biopolitical governance 
of neoliberalism. The care and racism at the heart of this governmental rationality entail 
preserving the financial system at home and transferring the price of this protection 
across national boundaries through the creation of an unpayable and inexpiable debt. 
Portrayed as the outcome of the inner guilt of an ‘inferior species’, debt becomes a 
biopolitical instrument of governance (see Lazzarato, 2015) that justifies preserving 
welfare provisions and public services — that is, life — at home and disrupting it abroad.
To further appreciate this argument, it is useful to compare Germany’s response to the 
effects of the 2008 financial crisis on its economy and Germany’s approach to the 2009 
Greek crisis. In late 2008, Berlin launched ‘an emergency bailout package of 480 billion 
euros for German banks’, followed by €115 billion to strengthen companies with finan-
cial problems, and two stimulus packages worth €80 billion in total to relaunch the 
economy through investment in infrastructure, tax breaks and business loans (Bennhold, 
2008; Spiegel, 2010). This ‘unprecedented large-scale economic investment’, supported 
by government labour subsidies aimed at avoiding redundancies, was highly successful 
and resulted in steady growth (Spiegel, 2010). Many scholars and public commentators 
(see, for instance, Mazzucato, 2015) have argued that Athens would require a similar 
investment strategy, accompanied by a series of structural reforms of the Greek econ-
omy. Instead, Germany — whose banks were the most exposed to Greek sovereign debt 
and were leveraged 32 to 1 (Lehman Brothers was leveraged 31 to 1 just before filing for 
bankruptcy and ushering in the largest financial crisis since the Great Depression) — 
forced Greece to adopt a completely different and thoroughly neoliberal approach to the 
crisis based on austerity measures, which has had the effect of creating more debt and 
social devastation. This double standard can be considered a manifestation of the biopo-
litical governance of neoliberalism. This entails mobilizing neoliberalism as a weapon in 
order to draw a biopolitical line between ‘what must live [flourish, proliferate and 
expand], and what must die’ (Foucault, 2003: 255).
The analysis carried out in this section suggests three main observations. First, there 
is an important tension at the heart of neoliberalism, which is also reflected in Foucault’s 
account. As previously discussed, Foucault claims that neoliberalism is based on the 
principles of competition and ‘governing for the market’ (i.e. supporting its existence 
and smooth functioning). However, these principles stand in an irresolvable tension. 
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Accepting the principle of competition would have required not bailing out European 
banks, which would have resulted in the crash of the financial market. Instead, the prin-
ciple of competition was sacrificed in order to preserve the stability and viability of the 
market and the neoliberal life of the European population.
Second, and accordingly, the Greek bailout responded to biopolitical rationalities of 
care and racism as part of a biopolitical-neoliberal apparatus that signals the progressive 
convergence of life and markets. From this perspective, the bailout can be considered a 
Polanyian countermovement: a biopolitical-neoliberal manifestation of governance 
instrumental to preserving the financialized life of the European population and the resil-
ience of neoliberalism through the construction of the Greek population as ‘threatening’, 
‘inferior’ and ‘non-European’. This case suggests that the biopolitical governance of 
neoliberalism may manifest itself not just through the adoption of mechanisms of social 
protection and welfare spending, but also by preserving the viability of financial institu-
tions, which are essential to the flourishing and well-being of neoliberal life.
Third, the biopolitical governance of neoliberalism is a tool that the wealthiest and 
more powerful states employ to preserve life at home and disrupt it abroad. Foucault, 
more than Polanyi, is essential to grasp this point with his notion of biopolitical racism. 
In fact, whereas Polanyi’s perspective invites us to consider how a process of social re-
embedding of the markets is essential to ensuring the resilience of neoliberalism and 
neoliberal life, Foucault’s approach alerts us to the fact that the biopolitical governance 
of neoliberalism may result in the projection of the tensions of neoliberalism onto less 
wealthy and powerful countries and in the creation of new opportunities for neoliberal 
exploitation. This is the case of Greece, condemned to social devastation by a German-
led European biopolitical governance that punishes irresponsible borrowing, but not irre-
sponsible lending, and creates neoliberal opportunities for accumulation by dispossession 
through a regime of imposed privatizations.
Conclusion
This article has explored the question of the resilience of neoliberalism. It has argued 
that neoliberalism and biopolitics should be considered two complementary and mutu-
ally reinforcing, but analytically distinct, governmental rationalities, and that biopoliti-
cal rationalities of care and racism play a crucial role in governing the uncertainty and 
risk stemming from the neoliberalization of life and neoliberalism’s inclination to pro-
duce crises. The discussion began with a review of existing accounts of the resilience of 
neoliberalism. In particular, I considered a first group of perspectives that have focused 
on the distinctive qualities of neoliberalism and how these have enabled neoliberalism 
either to ‘capture’ or ‘economize’ sovereign power and use it to govern its resilience. I 
then discussed a second group of scholars who have accounted for the resilience of 
neoliberalism by focusing on its biopolitical capacity to construct resilient subjects 
capable of adapting to the uncertainties of neoliberal competition and inequality. In the 
second section, drawing on and partially challenging Foucault, I showed how biopoli-
tics and neoliberalism represent two complementary governmental rationalities revolv-
ing around the principles of, respectively, care and competition. To better appreciate 
their relationship, I advanced a joint Foucauldian–Polanyian reading of biopolitical 
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countermovements as an expression of a governmental rationality aimed at governing 
populations through security apparatuses that protect neoliberal life from some of the 
risks, tensions and failures of neoliberalism, thus contributing to the latter’s resilience.
This theoretical perspective was then employed to analyse the governmentality of the 
Greek sovereign debt crisis. This approach enabled a novel understanding of the Greek 
bailout as an act of care aimed at rescuing European citizens from the risks of financial 
instability stemming from the exposure of European banks to Greek debt. Hence, I explored 
the resilience of neoliberalism not just as a problem of ‘saving the market’ or ‘governing 
the system’, but as a question of governing neoliberal life, namely, ensuring the resilience 
of neoliberalism by securing neoliberal life through a biopolitical intervention (the bailout) 
that transcended the mere construction of resilient subjects. There is no doubt that the puni-
tive bailout, by forcing the Greek population to embrace resilience, has also been a process 
of construction of neoliberal subjectivities. However, what matters most from the perspec-
tive of this article is that while the bailout trained the Greeks to be more resilient, it also 
trained Europeans to be less resilient as it biopolitically sheltered them from the potential 
failures of their banks. The bailout thus involved complementary but distinct biopolitical 
and neoliberal rationalities. Central to this analysis has been an appreciation of biopolitics 
as a politics of life and care of the population, and of racism towards and punishment of 
those ‘inferior species’ which threaten its survival and well-being. Hence, the punishment 
of irresponsible borrowers (the Greek population), but not of irresponsible lenders (the 
European banks), should be considered not exclusively and primarily as a product of the 
capacity of neoliberalism to ‘capture’ or ‘economize’ sovereign power, but as an outcome 
of the biopolitical governance of neoliberalism enacted by the most powerful states 
(European countries and Germany in particular) through biopolitical racism. The goal was 
to protect the financialized life of the European population by transferring the costs of 
neoliberalism’s crisis onto the ‘inferior’ Greek population, thus ensuring the resilience 
of neoliberalism and creating new opportunities for neoliberal dispossession.
This approach has three main implications. First, it challenges existing accounts of the 
resilience of neoliberalism by maintaining that biopolitics represents a distinct and com-
plementary form of governmental rationality instrumental to governing neoliberalism 
— hence, it suggests that the resilience of neoliberalism cannot be reduced to its qualities 
and that the role of biopolitics in this task cannot be reduced to the production of resilient 
subjects. Second, it articulates an original reading of Foucault’s largely underexplored 
relationship between neoliberalism and biopolitics. The approach advanced in this article 
challenges and partially reverses Foucault’s claim that neoliberalism should be under-
stood ‘as the general framework of biopolitics’ by suggesting that biopolitics should be 
understood as an independent and complementary governmental rationality that plays a 
key role in governing neoliberalism and its inclination to produce crises. Third, as shown 
by the analysis of the Greek bailout, the concept of biopolitical governmentality of 
neoliberalism complements and advances Polanyi’s notion of countermovements. The 
biopolitical governance of neoliberalism may result not just in the adoption of mecha-
nisms of social protection (the social re-embedding of the market), but also in the pres-
ervation of the viability of financial institutions — essential to secure the flourishing and 
well-being of neoliberal financialized life — and in transferring the crisis onto less 
wealthy and powerful countries through biopolitical racism in order to advance the 
dynamics of neoliberal exploitation. Preaching and imposing neoliberal austerity while 
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benefiting from biopolitical policies aimed at boosting the economy and creating jobs 
— as in the case of Germany’s attitude towards Greece — should be considered a mani-
festation of a biopolitical rationality that governs neoliberalism as a weapon in order 
to make ‘us’ live and let ‘them’ die.
The analysis carried out in this article thus indicates that the main task of sovereign 
institutions has been not just ‘saving the market’ or ‘governing the system’, but govern-
ing neoliberal life. This has entailed caring for the population under its control by restor-
ing the circulation of neoliberal financialized life through the identification of an enemy 
— an ‘inferior species’, to reprise Foucault’s expression — solely responsible for the 
crisis. This suggests that in order to understand and possibly challenge the resilience of 
neoliberalism, it is necessary to consider how it is made possible by rationalities of care 
that preserve neoliberal life through biopolitical interventions. The latter are virtually 
inseparable from forms of biopolitical racism that displace the source of risk, uncertainty 
and dispossession from the neoliberal regime onto ‘inferior’ populations, whose lack of 
compliance with neoliberal dictates is converted into a threat to our neoliberal survival 
and well-being that deserves punishment and authorizes further dynamics of neoliberal 
dispossession. Hence, if it is true, as Ani DiFranco sings, that ‘[e]very tool is a weapon 
if you hold it right’, it is not enough to critique neoliberalism as a weapon, but also vital 
to understand how the neoliberal weapon is held and handled, as well as who it is directed 
at and by whom. The concept of the biopolitical governance of neoliberalism advanced 
in this article aims to offer a novel perspective from which to explore this question.
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Notes
1. In what follows, my goal is neither to provide an exegesis/critique of Foucault’s arguments, 
nor to provide the ‘correct’ interpretation of his thought, but to reflect and elaborate on 
Foucault’s ‘deliberately evasive, elusive and provocative’ views (Joseph, 2013: 41) in order 
to advance a novel understanding of the relationship between neoliberalism and biopolitics.
2. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/greek_loan_facility/
pdf/01_mou_annex1_20150730_en.pdf (accessed 1 June 2016).
3. Interestingly, the German word for ‘guilt’ and ‘debt’ is exactly the same: schuld.
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